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FROZEN OBLIGATIONS: RUSSIA’S 
SUSPENSION OF THE CFE TREATY AS A 
POTENTIAL VIOLATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Adam Collicelli*
Abstract: As the world witnesses renewed displays of Russian military ag-
gression, the importance of multilateral arms treaties is illuminated. This 
Note argues that Russia’s suspension of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe was likely an illegal act, violating both the ex-
plicit terms of that treaty and the law governing international treaties, 
generally. The United Nations, NATO, and other world leaders must act 
carefully to redress this wrong without pushing Russia into a full with-
drawal from this significant treaty. This Note highlights the variety of dis-
pute resolution mechanisms available and concludes that formal public 
scrutiny and condemnation of Russia’s suspension are crucial to ensure 
that illegal treaty suspension does not become a reasonable option for 
Russia or any other international actors in the future. 
Introduction 
 On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin formally de-
creed that the Russian Federation would suspend its participation in 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), ef-
fective in 150 days.1 Sergei Kislyak, a Russian deputy foreign minister, 
suggested that a negotiated solution might be reached in the five-
month interim.2 That was not the case.3 Russia’s suspension of the CFE 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Adam Collicelli is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
1 Press Release, President of Russ., Information on the Decree “On Suspending the Rus-
sian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and 
Related International Agreements” ( July 14, 2007), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/ 
2007/07/137839.shtml; Duncan B. Hollis, Russia Suspends CFE Treaty Participation, 11 Am. 
Soc’y of Int’l L. Insight 19 ( July 23, 2007); Andrew E. Kramer & Thom Shanker, Russia 
Suspends Arms Agreement Over U.S. Shield, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2007, at A1; Russia Suspends Arms 
Control Pact, BBC News, July 14, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/ 
6898690.stm. 
2 Kramer & Shanker, supra note 1, at A1. 
3 See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed’n, Statement by Rus-
sia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding Suspension by Russian Federation of Treaty on 
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Treaty became official on December 12, 2007, immediately halting Rus-
sia’s obligations under this “cornerstone of European security.”4
 The significance of this unilateral act should not be overlooked. On 
the international stage, the CFE Treaty, which limits the deployment of 
heavy military equipment across Europe, embodies the sense of stability 
that developed on that continent since the fall of the Soviet Union.5 
The Russian foreign ministry admitted that this official rejection of a 
post-Cold War arms treaty had no precedent.6 Moreover, “Moscow’s as-
sertive revisionism” might spread its wings beyond just the CFE Treaty.7 
Some have suggested the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 
could be the next agreement that Russia decides to scrap.8
 Fully prepared for the legal scrutiny that would follow, Putin’s July 
14th decree defends his decision to suspend both in terms of interna-
tional and domestic law, claiming that this action was justified by vari-
ous “exceptional circumstances.”9 According to the CFE Treaty’s text, 
however, even exceptional circumstances would only justify full with-
drawal from the treaty, not suspension.10
 Part I of this Note provides a concise background of the 1990 CFE 
Treaty and the 1999 Adaptation Agreement, exploring both the specific 
and overarching goals that they sought to accomplish. Next, it focuses 
on Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty and its proffered rationale for 
this action. Part II discusses treaties generally and the ways in which a 
State can suspend participation in a treaty in accordance with interna-
tional law. It also provides a basis in how Russian domestic law ap-
proaches multilateral treaty obligations. Finally, this section applies the 
unilateral Russian suspension to this legal framework in an effort to 
establish whether the suspension did violate international law. Part III 
                                                                                                                      
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/ 
e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/10da6dd509e4d164c32573af004cc4be?; David Blair, 
Russia Is “Ditching Pacts” That Ended Cold War, Daily Telegraph (London), Feb. 6, 2008, at 
15; Richard Weitz, Russia’s CFE Suspension Threatens European Arms Control, World Pol. 
Rev., Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articlePrint.aspx?ID=1448. 
4 Russia Suspends Arms Control Pact, supra note 1. 
5 See John E. Peters, CFE and Military Stability in Europe, at xi(1997). 
6 Kramer & Shanker, supra note 1, at A1. 
7 Blair, supra note 3, at 15. 
8 See id. 
9 See Press Release, supra note 1. 
10 See Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe art. XIX, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 
I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter CFE Treaty]; Press Release, NATO, Alliance’s Statement on the Rus-
sian Federation’s “Suspension” of its CFE Obligations (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.nato. 
int/docu/pr/2007/p07–139e.html (noting that suspension is unavailable under the provi-
sions of the CFE Treaty). 
2009] Russia’s Suspension of the CFE Treaty 333 
assumes that such a violation did occur and analyzes how this interna-
tional delict should be remedied, taking into account widespread con-
cern over Russia’s nonparticipation in this crucial treaty. 
I. Background 
 The CFE Treaty is a landmark arms control agreement that at-
tempted to reduce the number of conventional military forces and es-
tablish parity between members of the Warsaw Pact and members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).11 The importance of 
this treaty was largely a result of the time in which it was enacted.12 It 
was conceived as a way to temper the security dilemmas created in a 
number of European States (divided into the two blocs of the Warsaw 
Pact and NATO States) by the bipolarity of the Cold War.13 Soon after 
negotiations for the treaty began in March, 1989, however, the Berlin 
Wall came down to reunite Germany and communism fell, dividing up 
the Soviet Union.14 A world of bipolarity was ending. Amidst this tu-
mult, the CFE Treaty took shape and was signed by 22 members of both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact on November 19, 1990.15 It entered into 
force on July 17, 1992.16
 The CFE Treaty’s aim of arms control was so timely precisely be-
cause the political future of Europe appeared so uncertain. Indeed, as 
Professor Joseph Nye noted, “arms control can become one of the tools 
for helping manage processes of political change . . . .” through the 
creation of regimes that deal with international security, helping to “le-
gitimize some activities and discourage others.”17 The stage was set for 
this particular treaty to ensure that security and stability were main-
tained and that the deeply rooted divisions of Europe could be over-
come.18
A. Structure of the 1990 CFE Treaty 
 At its core, the CFE Treaty sought to extinguish threats of military 
force that grew organically from the tension between NATO and War-
                                                                                                                      
11 See Hollis, supra note 1, at A1. 
12 See Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order: The Origins 
and Consequences of the CFE Treaty 266 (1995). 
13 Peters, supra note 5, at xi. 
14 Falkenrath, supra note 12, at 294–95. 
15 Id. at xiv. 
16 Id. at xv. 
17 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Arms Control and International Politics, 120 Daedalus 1, 162 (1991). 
18 CFE Treaty, supra note 10, pmbl. 
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saw Pact States.19 This was approached through a combination of quan-
titative parity in conventional armaments and complete transparency 
among the treaty parties on a number of matters concerning their mili-
tary force.20
 The CFE Treaty that was signed in 1990 imposed four main obliga-
tions on the participating States (Party States).21 These obligations 
were: (a) to cap the total amount of treaty limited equipment22 (TLE) 
situated between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains; (b) to 
reduce any excess TLE amounts to below the quantitative ceiling im-
posed by the treaty; (c) to provide information about all TLE to other 
Party States; and (d) to allow for verification of treaty compliance.23 
Since the treaty entered into force in 1992, 60,000 pieces of TLE have 
been destroyed and there have been over 4000 inspections.24
 The first two obligations are established in Articles IV–VIII of the 
CFE treaty. Article IV sets the quantitative ceilings of TLE for Party 
States, requiring the Warsaw Pact and NATO blocs respectively to have 
no more than 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 
20,000 pieces of artillery, 6800 combat aircraft, and 2000 attack heli-
copters.25 Articles IV–VIII require Party States to reduce their levels of 
TLE within forty months, either through destruction or conversion of 
the TLE into non-military equipment.26
 The third obligation of providing information appears in Article 
XIII of the CFE Treaty, requiring each Party State to provide notifica-
tions and exchange information based on the Protocol on Information 
Exchange.27 Party States must not only account for any TLE in their 
possession between the Atlantic Ocean and the Urals, but they also 
must provide information about their command structure, organiza-
tional concepts, and deployment.28 As stated in Article XVI, the Joint 
                                                                                                                      
19 Falkernath, supra note 12, at xi. 
20 See id. at xv. 
21 See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I–XV; Falkernath, supra note 12, at xv–xvii. 
22 CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. I (stating that the obligations in the treaty relate to 
five categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artil-
lery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters). 
23 Id.; Falkenrath, supra note 12, at xv–xvii; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, ( June 18, 2002), http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/military/library/news/2002/06/mil-020620-usia04.htm. 
24 Press Release, NATO, Questions and Answers on CFE 1 (May, 2007), http://www. 
nato.int/issues/arms_control/cfe_qa_factsheet.pdf. 
25 CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV. 
26 See id. arts. IV–VIII. 
27 See id. art. XIII. 
28 Falkernath, supra note 12, at xv. 
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Consultative Group was created in order to coordinate this sharing of 
information, which was to occur on the date of the treaty’s signing (No-
vember 19, 1990), upon its entry into force ( July 17, 1992), and there-
after each year on December 15.29
 Finally, verification of compliance in the reduction of TLE is ef-
fected through open inspections, as laid out in Articles XIII–XV.30 Each 
Party State has the obligation to receive inspections of its military facili-
ties and also the right to conduct inspections of military facilities in any 
other Party State.31
 Most pertinent to this Note, the ways in which the CFE Treaty can 
be terminated are delineated in Article XIX. This section begins by stat-
ing that the treaty would be of “unlimited duration.”32 It goes on, how-
ever, to establish that a Party State has two explicit means of with-
drawal.33 First, withdrawal is allowed if “extraordinary events related to 
the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter-
ests.”34 If a State wishes to take this unilateral step, it must give at least 
150 days notice of its intended withdrawal to the Depositary and all 
other parties, with a full statement of the “extraordinary events.”35 Sec-
ond, withdrawal is allowed if another party increases its holdings in 
TLE in violation of the CFE Treaty and, in doing so, creates an “obvious 
threat to the balance of forces within the area.”36
B. 1999 Adaptation Agreement 
 By the middle of the 1990s, the Warsaw Pact had dissolved and 
NATO had expanded, making the bloc categories of the CFE Treaty all 
but obsolete.37 In 1996, France and Russia proposed an amendment to 
the treaty that would replace the bloc TLE caps with individual State 
caps to reflect the current geopolitical situation of the region.38 In No-
vember 1999, each of the then thirty parties to the original treaty signed 
                                                                                                                      
29 Id. 
30 See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, arts. XIII–XV. 
31 Id. arts. XIV–XV. 
32 Id. art. XIX(1). 
33 Id. art. XIX(2),(3). 
34 Id. art. XIX(2). 
35 CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX(2). 
36 Id. art. XIX(3). 
37 See, e.g., Wade Boese, Russia Reduces CFE-Limited Weapons in Georgia, Arms Control 
Today, Sept. 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_09/cfesept00.asp. 
38 Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe CFE (2005), http://www.idds.org/issConvCFE.html. 
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the CFE Adaptation Agreement (Adaptation Agreement) at a summit in 
Istanbul.39
 Only four States, however, have fully ratified the Adaptation 
Agreement: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia.40 NATO member 
states have refrained from ratifying this agreement, asserting the unsatis-
factory fulfillment of three commitments Russia made in the 1999 nego-
tiations.41 First, Russian TLE were situated in excessive amounts in cer-
tain restricted “flank” regions and a commitment was made to reduce 
the troop levels to comply with the CFE Treaty.42 Second, Russia agreed 
to withdraw from the non-consensual military presence it had in 
Moldova.43 Third, Russia agreed to pull a certain number of forces out 
of Georgia.44 Though NATO concedes that Russia has fulfilled the first 
of these commitments (compliance with CFE Treaty caps in “flank” re-
gions), satisfactory withdrawal of troops from Moldova and Georgia has 
yet to occur.45 As such, the NATO member states refuse to ratify the Ad-
aptation Agreement and, therefore, it has not entered into force.46
C. Russia’s Suspension of the CFE Treaty 
 On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin made known 
his intentions to suspend his country’s participation in the CFE Treaty.47 
That intention became official on December 12, 2007.48 Given the his-
toric relationship between Russia and this treaty, the decision was not 
too surprising.49 The suspension will allow Russia to disregard the TLE 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 See Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, Nov. 19, 1999, http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1999/11/13760_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Adaptation Agreement]. 
40 Weitz, supra note 3. 
41 See Press Release, supra note 24, at 2. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. Indeed, in August of 2008, the Russian troop presence in Georgia grew sig-
nificantly as the regional hostility in South Ossetia led to a full-fledged military operation. 
See Timeline: Russia, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/ 
1113655.stm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). Though a peace agreement was eventually signed, 
Russian forces remain in the region, ensuring that these tensions would persist. See id. 
46 Weitz, supra note 3. 
47 Press Release, supra note 1. 
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed’n, supra note 3. 
49 See Falkenrath, supra note 12, at 243. Over a decade ago, Falkenrath noted that 
Russia had the least to gain from the CFE Treaty, with enough of a nuclear arsenal to deter 
any aggressors despite a minimized conventional force, and enough intelligence capabili-
ties to render the treaty’s transparency objectives somewhat redundant. See id. Indeed, 
Falkenrath predicted that pressure for Russian compliance with the CFE Treaty “can only 
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ceilings and refuse to provide information or allow inspections of its 
conventional forces.50
 Putin claimed that the following six “exceptional circumstances” 
justified Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty: 1) the failure of six for-
mer Warsaw Pact States (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic) to make adjustments in the treaty framework 
to account for their accession to NATO; 2) the excess of NATO mem-
bers that are parties to the treaty; 3) the American deployment of con-
ventional forces in Bulgaria and Romania; 4) the failure of a large num-
ber of parties to comply with commitments made at Istanbul in 1999; 5) 
the failure of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to ad-
just their territorial caps on TLE according to the Istanbul commit-
ments; and 6) the absence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from the 
CFE Treaty.51
II. Discussion 
A. Legal Methods of Evading Treaty Obligations 
 For centuries, treaties have been the standard tool used by the sub-
jects of international law to engage in various binding transactions with 
one another.52 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention), currently celebrating its fortieth birthday, codified the 
preexisting customary law of treaties that existed between State actors 
(as opposed to those involving non-governmental organizations).53 It 
defines a treaty as an “international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law.”54 Further, it 
makes explicit a fundamental principle guiding international law: pacta 
                                                                                                                      
be expected to work so long as the international community is able to impose costs on 
Russia that exceeds the foreign policy benefits Russia would expect to accrue from actions 
taken in violation of the treaty’s provisions.” Id. at 264. 
50 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Fed’n, supra note 3; Weitz, supra note 
3. 
51 See Press Release, supra note 1. 
52 See Mohammed M. Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds 
of Breach, at xix (1996). 
53 See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 3 (2000). 
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
338 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:331 
sunt servanda— “treaties must be obeyed.”55 At present, 108 States are 
party to the Vienna Convention, including the Russian Federation.56
 Once a treaty has entered into force, an important topic of con-
cern and occasional bone of contention is determining the duration of 
the binding obligations.57 When and how a treaty will end is a common 
issue discussed during the initial negotiation stage.58 Termination or 
withdrawal effectively ends a party’s participation in a treaty, an action 
that can only be undone through renewing consent to be bound (i.e., 
making a new treaty).59 Suspension, on the other hand, is presumably 
temporary and even during the suspension period a treaty relationship 
continues to exist between the parties.60 Moreover, the suspending 
party must “refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the 
operation of the treaty.”61 The Vienna Convention states that a party 
may terminate, withdraw, or suspend a treaty only through applying 
either: a) the explicit exit provisions of the treaty; or b) the provisions 
of the Vienna Convention itself.62 Thus, if such an act of termination, 
withdrawal or suspension deviates from these two avenues, it violates 
the Vienna Convention.63
 An explicit provision in a treaty may allow for legal termination of 
or withdrawal from a treaty64 or for suspension of its operation.65 In 
practice, the exit provisions in treaties vary and sometimes are alto-
gether absent.66 Most modern treaties, however, include some mecha-
nism to allow parties the opportunity to avoid the obligations set forth, 
making the legality of the act easier to determine.67
 The Vienna Convention, itself, allows for five alternative exit paths 
for treaty parties outside of the pertinent treaty text.68 To invoke one of 
these paths, the State must notify all other treaty parties of its intent at 
                                                                                                                      
55 Id. art. 26 (stating “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith”). 
56 Un.org, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, available at http://untreaty.un. 
org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp. 
57 See Aust, supra note 53, at 224. 
58 See id. 
59 See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 70. 
60 See id. art. 72. 
61 Id. art. 72(2). 
62 Id. art. 42(2). 
63 See id. 
64 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 54(a). 
65 Id. art. 57(a). 
66 Aust, supra note 53, at 225. 
67 See id. 
68 See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, arts. 54–62. 
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least three months prior to acting.69 Notably, the Vienna Convention 
distinguishes between justifications for withdrawal and those for sus-
pension of a treaty, though the requirements are largely the same.70 
First, a party may terminate or withdraw from a treaty71 or suspend its 
operation72 with the consent of the parties. For multilateral treaties, 
consultation is required with other “contracting States,” meaning those 
States which have consented to be bound, but for which the treaty has 
not yet come into force.73
 Second, Article 59 allows for termination or suspension of a treaty 
if a supervening treaty was concluded on the same subject matter by 
the exact same parties.74 This is the case only when there is a clear in-
tention to terminate or suspend the earlier treaty or the earlier treaty is 
incompatible with the new one.75
 Third, a treaty may be terminated or suspended as a response to a 
“material” breach of the treaty.76 A material breach is either a “repudia-
tion of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention” or one 
which violates a provision “essential to the accomplishment of the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty.”77 If there is a material breach in a multi-
lateral treaty, one of three scenarios may occur: 1) the other parties 
may suspend or terminate a treaty by unanimous agreement between 
themselves and the breaching State or between all parties; 2) a party 
“specially affected” by the breach may suspend its operation of the 
treaty between itself and the breaching State; or 3)if the breach “radi-
cally changes the position of every party with respect to the further per-
formance of its obligations under the treaty,” any non-breaching party 
may suspend the operation of the treaty.78 This final situation is espe-
cially relevant to disarmament treaties, where one party’s breach may 
endanger the whole group of treaty participants.79
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. art. 65(1) (stating that notification to all parties of the ground for suspension 
under the provisions of the VCT “shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken with 
respect to the treaty and the reasons therefor.”). 
70 See id. 
71 Id. art. 54(b). 
72 Id. art. 57(b). 
73 See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, arts. 54(b) & 57(b); Aust, supra note 53, at 
232. 
74 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 59. 
75 Id.; see also Aust, supra note 53, at 235–36. 
76 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 60(1). 
77 Id. art. 60(3). 
78 Id. art. 60(2). 
79 See Aust, supra note 53, at 238. 
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 Fourth, a party may terminate or withdraw from a treaty because of 
the supervening impossibility of performance of the treaty obliga-
tion(s).80 If it is merely a temporary impossibility, the party may only 
suspend its treaty operations.81 The threshold for impossibility is very 
high.82
 Finally, a party may terminate or withdraw from a treaty because of 
a fundamental change of circumstances. 83 The Vienna Convention al-
lows for suspension of a treaty’s operations if the same criteria are met.84 
A state may not cite its own conduct as the fundamental change.85 As 
with impossibility, the threshold to using this justification to exit a 
treaty’s obligations appears to be very high.86
 Unilateral acts of State treaty parties, which deviate from the treaty, 
are often presumed to be breaches because of the aforementioned 
limitations.87 If a State party is justified in withdrawing from or sus-
pending a treaty’s operation, the Vienna Convention provides the pro-
cedure to be employed in Article 65.88 The State must first notify all of 
the other parties of the treaty of its claim for withdrawal or suspen-
sion.89 Unless there is a case of “special urgency,” a period of three 
months must elapse in which any other party to the treaty duly notified 
of the claim may express an objection.90 If no objection is raised in that 
period, then the State may proceed with its withdrawal or suspension by 
way of an official written instrument.91 If an objection is raised, how-
ever, the parties are directed to resolve the dispute via Article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).92
                                                                                                                      
80 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 61. 
81 Id. 
82 See id. (stating that “impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or de-
struction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty”). 
83 Id. art. 62. 
84 Id. 
85 See Aust, supra note 53, at 241. 
86 See id. at 241–42. 
87 See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579, 1581 (2005). 
88 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 65. 
89 Id. art. 65(1). 
90 Id. art. 65(2). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. art. 65(3). Article 33 of the UN Charter calls on parties to an international dis-
pute that risks global peace and security to engage in some type of dispute resolution such 
as negotiation, arbitration, mediation, judicial settlement, or other peace means. U.N. 
Charter, art. 33, para. 1. If necessary, the United Nations Security Council can step in to 
request that the parties engage in this type of peaceful settlement process. Id. art. 33, para. 
2. 
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B. Russian Suspension of the CFE Treaty Violates the Vienna Conventi 
1. Russia did not adhere to the exit provisions of the CFE Treaty 
 Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty may constitute a violation of 
the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Convention, both of which Russia has 
duly ratified.93 First, the CFE Treaty itself provides no express authori-
zation for a party to suspend its operation, but only allows for full with-
drawal from the treaty under specific limitations.94 Withdrawal and sus-
pension are two entirely different acts.95 Although the CFE Treaty 
arguably may contain an implicit right of suspension, the fact that there 
exists an explicit provision for withdrawal severely damages this argu-
ment.96 In addition, because it has become commonplace for treaties 
to include explicit exit provisions, a treaty’s silence on the matter is 
more likely to imply the absence of the exiting option.97 Finally, the 
CFE Treaty’s drafters may have intentionally excluded the right to sus-
pend if they viewed it as an invitation to a “temporally opportunistic 
exit.”98 To be sure, any restriction on exiting a multilateral treaty can be 
viewed as an intelligent way of encouraging continuous cooperation 
among the parties.99
  In any event, Putin’s actions portray no effort in advocating any 
implied right to suspension and, instead, purport to adhere to the ex-
plicit terms of the CFE Treaty.100 By citing “exceptional circumstances” 
and granting notice of 150 days, both required for a proper “with-
drawal” under the CFE Treaty, indicates that Putin equated suspension 
with withdrawal.101 Yet, since Russia did not endeavor to withdraw from 
the treaty, its intent to suspend has no legal basis in the express lan-
guage of the CFE Treaty itself.102
                                                                                                                      
93 See Hollis, supra note 1. 
94 See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX. 
95 See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 54, arts. 56–57 (expressly distinguishing be-
tween withdrawal from and suspension of a treaty’s operation). 
96 See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX. 
97 See Aust, supra note 53, at 234. 
98 See Helfer, supra note 87, at 1625. 
99 See id. at 1633. 
100 See Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that the suspension is “in conformity with in-
ternational law”). 
101 The author construes as equivalent the phrase used by Putin (“exceptional circum-
stances”) and the phrase found in Article XIX of the CFE Treaty (“extraordinary events”). 
See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX; Press Release, supra note 1. 
102 See CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX; Press Release, supra note 1. 
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2. Russia’s suspension is likely not justified under any provision of the 
Vienna Convention 
 The only other way for Russia’s suspension of the CFE treaty to 
have been legal under current international law would require justifica-
tion under a provision of the Vienna Convention.103 As discussed above, 
those possibilities are: party consent, supervening treaty, impossibility, 
fundamental change, and material breach.104 The only two plausible 
possibilities, as explained below, which might justify the suspension are 
the existence of a fundamental change of circumstances or the breach 
of the CFE Treaty.105
 Party consent106 is the easiest of these other justifications to elimi-
nate because it is strikingly clear that many of the CFE Treaty Party 
States did not consent to Russia’s suspension.107 Indeed, three days af-
ter Putin’s announcement, NATO responded with a press release, 
which disclosed its deep disappointment in the Russian decision and a 
desire to maintain the CFE Treaty’s operation.108
 Second, the supervening treaty justification for suspension is also 
quickly eliminated because there was no such treaty between the exact 
same parties.109 The 1999 Adaptation Agreement might have qualified 
as such a supervening treaty as it was an update to the CFE Treaty and 
Russia was a party to it.110 That agreement, however, never entered into 
force because of the lack of ratifiers.111 Even if the Adaptation Agree-
ment had come into force, it makes no change to the CFE Treaty’s exit 
provision (Article XIX), so it would not have made any alteration in 
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regard to suspension.112 Thus, no supervening treaty can justify Russia’s 
suspension of the CFE Treaty.113
 Third, Russia’s participation in the CFE Treaty has likely not be-
come impossible.114 For this justification of treaty suspension, there 
needs to be at least a temporary “disappearance or destruction of an 
object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.”115 There are few 
examples of what could render a treaty’s operation impossible in this 
way, though the International Law Commission has mentioned as pos-
sible examples the submergence of an island or the destruction of a 
dam.116 No such indispensable object has been lost, even temporarily, 
here.117 The six “exceptional circumstances” that Putin offered on July 
14, 2007, involve political objections to what was occurring or not oc-
curring within other CFE Treaty party States along with the “adverse 
effects” of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s non-participation on Russia’s 
northwestern security.118 As pressing as these concerns may have been, 
none of them reflect an absent “indispensable object,” which could de-
prive Russia of its ability to perform the tasks under the treaty (i.e., 
maintaining a certain amount of TLE west of the Ural Mountains, pro-
viding information of those amounts, and allowing inspections to verify 
compliance).119
 Fourth, a fundamental change of circumstances has likely not oc-
curred, which could otherwise legitimize Russia’s unilateral suspension 
of the CFE Treaty.120 This justification is extremely narrow and there is 
not one distinct example of a successful assertion of the doctrine in any 
international case.121 The International Court of Justice famously re-
jected Hungary’s attempt to utilize this justification for its own suspen-
sion of a treaty, when it cited profound political changes.122 The Court 
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denied that a fundamental change of circumstances had occurred and 
emphasized that treaty law stability demands that this exit route for 
treaty obligations must be applied in only the most exceptional cases.123
 Here, Putin’s complaint about the widening of the NATO alliance 
without a concurrent adjustment to the CFE Treaty may be the closest 
thing to a fundamental change of circumstances.124 Since the CFE 
Treaty was first signed in 1990, the Warsaw Pact fell apart and several 
former Warsaw Pact nations joined NATO, but the treaty has not 
changed in kind.125 Whether this political change was more of a radical 
transformation than occurred in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project is out 
of the scope of the present Note.126 The change of circumstances re-
mains, however remotely, one arguable justification.127
 This leaves the possibility that a material breach to the CFE Treaty 
occurred, which justified Putin’s suspension.128 Putin has proffered a 
list of six “exceptional circumstances” that supported Russia’s suspen-
sion of the CFE Treaty.129 Can any of these circumstances qualify as a 
material breach of the CFE Treaty in order to justify Russia’s unilateral 
suspension?130 The only assertion that might be construed as a material 
breach is the first: The failure of the new NATO states to make the 
“necessary changes in the composition of group of states party to the 
Treaty.”131 Such a failure to act would not constitute the type of mate-
rial breach that the Vienna Convention calls an unsanctioned treaty 
repudiation.132 Instead, it would have to fall under a violation of a pro-
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vision essential to the objects and purposes of the treaty.133 Again, the 
merit of this argument is outside of this Note’s scope. It remains, as 
does the fundamental change in circumstances, one plausible justifica-
tion for Russia’s unilateral suspension under the Vienna Convention.134
 Even if there was a material breach or a fundamental change in 
circumstances, to invoke any of these Vienna Convention exit justifica-
tions Putin would have had to specifically notify the other Party States 
at least three months prior to suspension.135 In terms of notification, 
Putin did give 150 days notice to the CFE Treaty parties prior to its sus-
pension, but his notification aimed to suspend within the bounds of the 
CFE Treaty.136 If any argument for suspension based on Vienna Con-
vention provisions was also to be made, further notification of that was 
necessary.137
 In addition, under Article 65 of the Vienna Convention, any noti-
fied party may object to the assertions in the notification.138 NATO’s 
press release a few days after Putin’s decree might qualify as an objec-
tion,139 which would initiate a dispute requiring a resolution in accor-
dance with the UN Charter’s Article 33.140 No such dispute settlement 
has occurred. 
C. Russian Federal Law Cannot Preempt International Law 
 In his July 14th decree, Putin stated that Russian federal law fur-
ther justified his suspension of the CFE Treaty.141 Putin was referring to 
the Federal Law on International Treaties of the Russian Federation 
(Russian Law on Treaties), which Russia adopted on June 16, 1995.142 
Article 37 of the Russian Law on Treaties authorizes the Russian Presi-
dent to suspend a multilateral treaty “in instances requiring the taking of 
urgent measures.”143 The federal law does not, however, authorize the 
President to terminate or withdraw from a treaty.144 Putin cited Article 
37 of the Russian Law on Treaties, declaring that it gave him the ability 
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to suspend the CFE Treaty since it was a situation of “necessity”, requir-
ing “immediate action.”145 Of course, Russian domestic law did not 
empower Putin to withdraw from treaties, so he was forced into relying 
on suspension.146
  There is a clear conflict between Putin’s inability to withdraw from 
an international treaty under Russian domestic law and the lack of a 
way to suspend the CFE Treaty according to its text.147 Putin’s reliance 
on domestic law to increase his number of ways to exit an international 
treaty will not pass legal muster.148 Since the CFE Treaty has entered 
into force in Russia, it prevails over inconsistent domestic law.149 In fact, 
the preamble to the Russian Law on Treaties states: “The Russian Fed-
eration favours undeviating compliance with treaty and customary 
norms and affirms its adherence to the basic principle of international 
law—the principle of the good-faith fulfillment of international obliga-
tions.”150 Article 5 of the Russian Law on Treaties even further provides: 
“If other rules have been established by an international treaty of the 
Russian Federation than those provided for by a law, then the rules of 
the international treaty shall apply.”151 Thus, although Putin only pos-
sessed the authority to single-handedly enforce a suspension under 
Russian domestic law, if the CFE Treaty effectively prohibits suspen-
sions, then the CFE Treaty’s prohibition must prevail.152
III. Analysis 
A. Seeking a Solution: Possible Remedies to Russian Suspension If It Violates 
International Treaty Law 
 This analysis assumes arguendo that Russia’s suspension was a viola-
tion of both the CFE Treaty (unilateral suspension was not an available 
option under the treaty) and the Vienna Convention (suspension can-
not be otherwise justified). The remainder of this Note addresses what 
realistic remedies are available to correct this type of delict, which al-
lows Russia to enjoy the security benefits of the CFE Treaty without fac-
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ing any of its responsibilities. Any remedy must also aim to discourage 
Russia from fully withdrawing from the CFE Treaty.153 The precarious-
ness of the situation is augmented by the true importance of the treaty 
in achieving global security.154
 The CFE Treaty’s preamble states that the parties have made a 
commitment to “[c]ontinue the conventional arms control process in-
cluding negotiations, taking into account future requirements for Euro-
pean stability and security in the light of political developments in 
Europe.”155 Russia argues that its suspension was triggered by exactly 
such political developments156, while the NATO parties would argue 
that the suspension risks restoring the security imbalance in Europe that 
the CFE Treaty aimed to fix.157 Either way, the suspension has resulted 
in Moscow’s current refusal to provide information about its conven-
tional military forces between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Moun-
tains.158 The new freedom also opens the door to troop escalations in 
some regions of Russia, though the head of the Russian General Staff 
has discounted that notion.159
 Assuming that Russia’s suspension was contrary to international 
law, more forceful objections must be made in the international com-
munity to condemn the behavior.160 Although NATO and individual 
States have expressed clear disappointment in Putin’s unilateral act, a 
more definitive objection to its illegality is in order.161 Such an act 
would undoubtedly activate Article 33 of the UN Charter, directing ac-
tors to initiate some type of dispute resolution.162
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 Further negotiations between Russia and the remaining CFE 
Treaty Party States is an obvious option at the current impasse.163 This 
is the most common method of settling treaty disputes.164 Negotiations 
have, however, been unsuccessful in the past.165 Putin arranged the Ex-
traordinary Conference of State Parties to the Treaty on Conventional 
Forces in Europe in Vienna on June 11–15, 2007 precisely to open a 
dialogue about his concerns, but no agreement could be reached.166 
After Russia’s unilateral violation of the CFE Treaty, it may be even 
more difficult to achieve a negotiated resolution now than it was during 
the June conference.167 Still, considering how the current CFE Treaty 
maintains the geography of the Cold War, serious negotiations to get 
the Adapted Agreement entered into force are long overdue.168
 Another possible form of dispute resolution is conciliation, 
wherein a Conciliation Commission can hear both parties’ claims and 
objections and then make recommendations that could eventually lead 
to an amicable result.169 These commissions usually are made up of 
three to five members representing each side of the dispute and a 
third-party chairperson.170 Since the result of the conciliation is non-
binding, it may be easier to persuade Russia to participate. At the same 
time, without a binding result, the time and expense of a conciliation 
may be impractical.171
 Seeking a compulsory binding settlement through either an arbi-
tration or litigation in the International Criminal Court is a less plausi-
ble solution.172 Even if Russia is convinced it did nothing wrong, it 
would be unlikely to provide the requisite consent to such binding pro-
ceedings.173 This is mainly because instead of facing the time and ex-
pense involved in litigation, Russia could simply undertake a full with-
drawal from the CFE Treaty, in accordance with the treaty’s 
provisions.174
                                                                                                                      
163 See Aust, supra note 53, at 288; Blair, supra note 3; NATO Reponse, supra note 108 
(requesting a “constructive and creative dialogue”). 
164 Aust, supra note 53, at 286. 
165 NATO Response, supra note 108. 
166 Id. 
167 See Weitz, supra note 3. 
168 See Boese, supra note 37; Hollis, supra note 1. 
169 Vienna Convention, supra note 54, Annex. 
170 Aust, supra note 53, at 289. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 290. 
173 See id. 
174 CFE Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIX. 
2009] Russia’s Suspension of the CFE Treaty 349 
 If the other CFE Treaty parties see the unilateral act as unaccept-
able, however, and wish to get a legal judgment to that effect, seeking a 
decision from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) could be an op-
tion.175 In 1979, for example, the United States brought a case before 
the ICJ concerning the seizure and holding as hostages of members of 
the U.S. diplomatic and consular staff in Iran.176 Despite the fact that 
Iran refused to plead or argue before the ICJ, the case proceeded on 
the merits.177 This may have been an effort to “use the Court’s decision 
as a means for translating a dispute between Iran and the United States 
specifically into one between Iran and the international community 
generally.”178 By filing a suit in the ICJ, however, other CFE Treaty par-
ties would be widening the divide between themselves and Russia, 
which is precisely the problem that demands a solution.179
 Another course of action that may be possible here was high-
lighted by the attempted withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (DPRK) from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 1993.180 On March 12, 1993, the DPRK announced it would with-
draw from the NPT in 90 days, due to “extraordinary events . . . [which 
have] jeopardized [its] supreme interests . . . .”181 The extraordinary 
events cited were the U.S. military exercises that threatened the DPRK 
with nuclear war and certain actions of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency.182
 The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, three other 
parties to the NPT, expressed to the United Nations (in a joint state-
ment dated April 1, 1993) their concern that the DPRK’s cited justifica-
tions for withdrawal did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” 
and, therefore, that the withdrawal violated the NPT.183 The United 
Nations Security Council quickly responded on May 11, 1993 in a reso-
lution that took into account all of the surrounding facts, including the 
DPRK’s letter asserting justifications for withdrawal, the April 1st letter 
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opposing withdrawal, and the “critical importance” of the NPT.184 The 
resolution called upon the DPRK to “reconsider” its decision to with-
draw and reaffirm its commitment to the NPT.185 Furthermore, it en-
couraged all members of the NPT to work together to establish a solu-
tion to the problem, reserving further Security Council action if 
necessary.186
 Though the precise impact of this U.N. Resolution is difficult to 
ascertain, further negotiations occurred soon after its announcement 
and they were fruitful.187 Exactly one month after the resolution, the 
DPRK halted its plans for withdrawal from the NPT just before they be-
came effective.188 On October 21, 1994, the United States and the 
DPRK signed an Agreed Framework, effectively ending the crisis.189
 Given the various similarities between the NPT crisis and the cur-
rent situation with the CFE Treaty, an appeal to the U.N. Security 
Council seems prudent.190 The future of both arms treaties was threat-
ened by the potentially illegal exit (be it temporary or permanent) of 
one of the key parties.191 With regard to the CFE Treaty, not only is 
there a strong argument that the “exceptional circumstances” provided 
by Putin were insufficient, but there is an additional argument that the 
entire act of suspension was a violation of the treaty’s text on its face.192 
If the Security Council felt compelled to issue a resolution in 1993, it 
may, therefore, feel more compelled to assert itself now.193 The other 
members of the CFE Treaty should write a joint letter to the Security 
Council addressing their concern on this matter.194
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B. Global Reaction to Russia’s Suspension: Reputational Harm 
 If the global public carefully scrutinizes Putin’s unilateral suspen-
sion of the CFE Treaty in light of its potential illegality, Russia may be 
more receptive to further serious negotiations aimed at finding a reso-
lution quickly and amicably.195 Although Putin’s act may have strength-
ened his popularity domestically and assisted in the 2008 election of 
Dmitri Medvedev, his choice for the new president, a visibly improper 
exit from an important arms treaty could have severe long-term conse-
quences for Russia.196 Most importantly, it may make other States more 
hesitant to enter into agreements with Russia in the future.197
 The lackluster attempts of NATO and other States in expressing 
their “disappointment” of Putin’s suspension may stem from the regu-
larity of treaty exits.198 In 2002, for example, the United States unilater-
ally withdrew from another important arms agreement: the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty).199 President Bush’s withdrawal, however, 
was at least available to him in the ABM Treaty’s text.200 Putin’s suspen-
sion was potentially authorized by neither the governing treaty nor the 
Vienna Convention.201 If the international community does not unite in 
its opposition to acts that facially violate an important treaty, a new 
precedent may develop that encourages State actors to regularly rely on 
illegal treaty suspension as a bargaining tool.202
Conclusion 
 Both international legal scholars and international relations theo-
rists have long focused on what is involved in entering into treaties, but 
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have generally ignored careful studies of treaty exit.203 Russia’s unilat-
eral and potentially unlawful suspension of the CFE Treaty is a re-
minder of how crucial this portion of treaty law can be. The CFE Treaty 
does not explicitly authorize suspension. The Vienna Convention does 
not convincingly provide for any other justification for the suspension 
and Putin did not attempt to invoke one. Thus, Russia’s suspension 
likely violated the CFE Treaty. 
 As a result, the other CFE Treaty Party States are left in an awkward 
predicament. To be sure, they are pleased that Putin did not yet with-
draw from this important treaty altogether. There is a chance, however, 
that Putin never would have taken this more dramatic step, and that he 
simply capitalized on suspension to elevate Russia’s negotiating pos-
ture. If this is the case, then the tactic must be outwardly condemned. 
As Richard Falkenrath so astutely noted more than a decade ago, Rus-
sia’s participation in the CFE Treaty hinges on the international com-
munity’s ability to convince Russia that the costs of an unlawful treaty 
exit exceed any potential political benefits.204 If the international com-
munity cannot do this, then the CFE Treaty may not be the only casu-
alty. Indeed, the very benefits attained from engaging in international 
agreements will be in true jeopardy if parties can invariably deviate 
from those agreements and halt their responsibilities for political gain. 
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